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Temptation to Self-Indulgence?
Aesthetics and Function in Recent Art Museum Design1
Larry Shiner
Over the last decade we have come to expect audacious designs for new 
art museums, such as the 2004 Kunsthaus in Graz, Austria, which looks 
like some tentacled science fiction creature dropped into the midst of a 
Baroque city. Such wild architectural fantasies have given rise to com-
plaints that museum architecture has too often become the real art work 
overshadowing what is inside. There is little doubt that most of those who 
fly to Bilbao to visit the Guggenheim Museum are going primarily to see 
Frank Gehry’s shimmering titanium sculpture. Many critics have worried 
that in such buildings, “flash and bravura win out over contemplation 
[…] and architecture triumphs over art.”2 Complaints of this kind actu-
ally combine two objections that ought to be distinguished. One is that 
spectacular architecture will outshine the art, but this objection is hardly 
worrisome since it seems appropriate that an art museum would itself 
be a work of art. But there is another, more serious charge, which is that 
strange curves, odd angles, and enormous heights in the galleries may 
distract our attention from the art.3 Confronted with such a clash between 
architecture as art and architecture for art most people would say: Why 
not have both? Indeed, our natural inclination seems to be that aesthet-
ics and function should be united in any work of architecture. Yet, we 
also seem to have an equally natural inclination to appreciate outstanding 
buildings just for their appearance without regard to function. Can these 
two intuitions be reconciled? Can they be philosophically justified? In the 
course of answering these questions we will discover that the controversy 
over radical art museum design is an exemplary case for reflecting on 
some central problems in the philosophy of architecture. 
In order for us to have some examples in common, I have chosen two 
cases of iconic museums that some critics have celebrated for their dar-
ing architecture, but other critics have complained interfere with viewing 
their art. One is the 1997 Guggenheim Bilbao itself. Although the glitter-
ing Baroque curves of its sculptural exterior are its best known feature, 
Temptation to Self-Indulgence?
55
the Bilbao is equally notable for its unusual interior. The soaring, curvilin-
ear atrium reaches over thirty meters, and many of the galleries that ex-
tend off it are oddly shaped and outsized, one of them, over a 150 meters 
long, dwarfed everything put into it during the museum’s early years. Yet, 
these vast spaces were not simply artistic self-indulgence on Gehry’s part, 
but reflected the conviction of Thomas Krens, the Guggenheim’s direc-
tor, that contemporary art demands exhibition spaces of huge scale and 
extraordinary character. Moreover, the Bilbao government was betting on 
a spectacular piece of architecture to revitalize the city. 
Although Gehry himself has explicitly rejected what he calls the “the 
mythology […] that a museum for art has to be deferential and […] not com-
pete with the art,” he actually provided more conventional galleries for 
older types of modernist painting, and reserved his high, asymmetrical 
galleries for late modernist and contemporary works.4 A few critics feel 
that his dramatic galleries do distract the viewer’s attention from the art, 
but others believe the Bilbao museum is not only a magnificent work of 
architectural art, but “is a place where art and architecture finally meet in 
harmonious amplification.”5 
Before looking at my other example of a spectacle museum, I want 
briefly to consider a less dramatic museum for purposes of compari-
son. Rafael Moneo’s Moderna Museet in Stockholm opened just a year 
after the Bilbao Guggenheim. Instead of making a glittering monumen-
tal statement, however, it deliberately blends into the built environment 
of Skeppsholmen island. But Moneo is proudest of his lighting system, 
based on the lantern-like skylights that are the most conspicuous formal 
feature of the museum from the outside. He says that he sought to create 
“a piece of architecture that is so appropriate to its function that a strict 
continuity emerges between the source of light and the walls […] it is al-
most like being inside a lamp.”6 
My other example of a spectacle museum is Daniel Libeskind’s 2006 
Hamilton Building at the Denver Art Museum	in the United States,	a build-
ing whose	glowing jumble of angles has helped put Denver on the architec-
tural map. Many architecture critics have highly praised Libeskind’s dar-
ing cubistic sculpture for the way it enlivens downtown Denver. But what 
it does to the art within is more controversial, with some critics praising 
its striking angles, and others finding them terribly dysfunctional.7 Just as 
there are hardly any vertical or horizontal lines on the outside of the build-
ing, so also on the inside, almost every wall leans outward or inward with 
many rooms in odd, trapezoidal shapes, sometimes narrowing to a point 
in the corners.8 As a result, exhibition designers and curators have faced 
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a tremendous challenge. Occasionally, a piece of contemporary sculpture 
seems to fit this tilted environment, but more conventional works are 
either overwhelmed or, in the case of paintings, one is distracted by the 
braces that are used to hold them vertical. When one adds the fact that 
thick boards or potted plants have had to be placed on the floor in front 
of the more severely inward slanting walls to keep people from bumping 
their heads, some critics have concluded that the design is too self-centered 
to consider the needs of the art public.	As one put it,	Libeskind’s “tortured 
geometries, generated by purely formal considerations” make it “virtually 
impossible to enjoy the art.”9 
The obvious lesson of these brief examples is that no matter how radi-
cal an art museum design may appear on the outside, the real test of its 
successful functioning is whether the spaces within are designed to sup-
port the art. Thus, when Frank Gehry rejects the idea that a museum de-
sign should not compete with the art, I could agree, if he is referring to the 
exterior or the atrium, but it is hard to believe even he thinks the design of 
the galleries should directly compete with the art. Yet, in the words of the 
architect, Renzo Piano, whose museum designs have often been praised 
for integrating architecture and art, “You can’t just build neutral white 
spaces. They kill works of art just as much as hyperactive spaces that 
make the building a piece of self-indulgence.”10 Piano’s criticism of both 
deadly neutral spaces and self-indulgent “hyperactive spaces” reflects the 
ordinary intuition, mentioned earlier, that an art museum should ideally 
be both an interesting work of art itself and serve the art it contains. But 
the enthusiasm of many critics for Gehry’s and Libeskind’s spectacular 
museum exteriors also reflects our other ordinary intuition, namely, that 
some works of architecture are so outstanding visually that we may over-
look their functional faults. Let us turn now to some possible philosophi-
cal grounds for adjudicating these two intuitions.
Many philosophers of architecture have noted that whereas other arts 
may be employed for some purpose beyond aesthetic appreciation, most 
works of architecture are made to serve some practical function (with 
follies as borderline cases and paper or digital architecture as excep-
tions).11 It is significant that one of the first writers to articulate the mod-
ern system of the Fine Arts, the Abbé Batteux writing in 1746, placed 
architecture in a special category he called mixed arts that combine the 
pleasures of the fine arts with the utility of the mechanical arts.12 Subse-
quent theorists dropped Batteux’s category of mixed arts, and the role of 
function in architecture as a fine art became problematic. Although most 













necessary condition of architecture, a few, like Schopenhauer and Ruskin, 
have treated function as largely irrelevant. 
Before we go any farther, however, I need to comment on the ambi-
guity of the term function.13 Although function has been a central motif 
in architectural writing since the early twentieth century, writers from 
Vitruvius to Batteux used the term utility.14 Today, utility seems to imply 
a narrower, means-end relationship, whereas function suggests the role 
something plays within a larger system as implied by its use in biology or 
anthropology. Even broader uses of function have emerged among theo-
rists of architecture many of whom have spoken of architecture’s social 
function, its ethical function, its symbolic function, even its aesthetic 
function.15 Thus, one could rephrase the disagreement over the place of 
function in architecture, as a disagreement over the relative importance 
of two kinds of function: one side emphasizing practical function, the 
other side aesthetic function, where aesthetic function is taken to mean 
that a work of architecture is designed with the intention that its formal 
elements (shape, space, light, texture, color) will evoke a positive aesthetic 
response. Rather than contrasting aesthetic function with practical func-
tion, of course, architectural theory has usually spoken of form vs. func-
tion, and I will follow that practice. But we also need to note that just as 
there is an important relationship between aesthetics and practical func-
tion, there are also significant relationships between aesthetics and other 
architectural functions whether social, environmental, ethical, or sym-
bolic. Although some of these functions will briefly come into view in the 
following discussion, unless otherwise noted, I will use the term function 
to mean practical function or utility. 
The philosopher Gordon Graham has usefully suggested four types of 
position on form and function.16 At one pole is extreme functionalism, 
which says that form ought to follow function in the sense of being de-
termined by it.17 But, as Graham points out, if one takes the idea of the 
functional determination of form strictly, it will collapse, since, for any 
given function, there are innumerable possible forms that would work. 
The stripped down, simplified look of modernism, for example, was not a 
necessary requirement of function, but a stylistic choice arising from an 
animus to ornament and historical styles. A second possible position at 
the other extreme would have form determine function. But a given form 
can also have innumerable and often unforeseen functional effects. 
Few today embrace either of these extreme positions, but a third possi-
bility has continued to seem attractive: the position that form and function 
are sufficiently independent to be judged separately. As Schopenhauer put 
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it long ago, “the great merit of the architect is achieving purely aesthetic 
ends […] in spite of other ends foreign to them.”18 This view leads to a 
tendency to focus either on a building’s exterior shape and qualities or, if 
the interior is included, to view it only in terms of formal properties. In 
some architecture journals and monographs, for example, one can still find 
critical discussions that hardly mention function and are accompanied by 
photographs of the building’s empty interior before furnishings or people 
have intruded upon its architectural purity.
Less extreme versions of this separatist view have been associated with 
the widely used conceptual polarity: architecture vs. building.19 Its most 
cited version has been the declaration of the historian, Nicholas Pevsner: 
“A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is architecture […] the term 
architecture applies only to buildings designed with a view to aesthetic 
appeal.”20 But if one defines architecture in such a way that only “aesthetic 
appeal” is essential, there would obviously be no basis in principle to criti-
cize functionally inadequate designs as architecturally deficient.21 A func-
tionally inadequate design could still be considered an excellent work of 
architecture since its function would be seen as belonging to it only qua 
building. But the architecture vs. building polarity is clearly an evaluative 
continuum pretending to be a categorical disjunction. Lincoln Cathedral 
may be considered architecture primarily because of its artistic properties, 
but as a church it remains a functional building. Conversely, the lowliest 
bicycle shed possesses some aesthetic properties. If used merely as a way 
of delimiting the subject matter of architectural history, the architecture 
vs. building contrast may be a convenient distinction, but in order for it 
to become a dichotomy justifying a purely aesthetic approach to architec-
ture, one would have to prop it up with a set of formalist assumptions.22 
A fourth possible relation of form and function is the idea that form 
and function ought to be somehow united in works of architecture – the 
ordinary intuition with which we began. This unity can be conceived 
loosely as a kind of complementarity, or it can be formulated more in-
timately as an ideal of a perfect integration, as in Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
dictum: “form and function are one.”23 But whether the unity of form and 
function is formulated broadly as a kind of concord or ideally as a perfect 
marriage, the philosophical question is: Can the two also be joined within 
the process of aesthetic judgment itself? 
Several philosophers writing on architecture in recent decades have 
suggested they can be so joined by using terms like form fitting, articu-
lating, or expressing function. An essay by Alan Carlson, for example, 
has vigorously affirmed that the way a building’s form fits its practical 
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functions is central to our aesthetic appreciation of it.24 Unfortunately, 
he does not tell us much about how functions might affect our aesthetic 
appreciation. If we turn to what Gordon Graham, Roger Scruton, and Ed-
ward Winter say about form expressing specific functions we find even 
less help. Although all three begin by declaring that utility or function 
is a necessary condition of something being architecture, each of them 
rejects the idea that a building’s specific practical function is crucial to its 
aesthetic appreciation. For Graham the idea of form expressing specific 
functions is likely to result in such absurdities as trying to figure out how 
a gothic pile like St. Pancras Station in London expresses train travel.25 
Scruton and Winter say not only that there is no way to clarify the no-
tion of form expressing practical functions, but that it would not make 
any difference if there was, since the functions of buildings change over 
time.26 For Scruton what remains most important in the appreciation of 
architecture is “to find meaning in appearance itself,” so that “aesthetic 
considerations […] must take precedence over all other factors.”27
Having found little help on the relation of form to specific function 
in these works, I want to begin afresh by briefly describing three struc-
tural characteristics of a typical art museum experience that also have 
important implications for understanding the aesthetic judgment of 
architecture in general. First, our aesthetic experience of architecture is 
seldom purely contemplative, but involves a complex and highly mobile 
interaction. This is especially true of our experience of the interior of a 
building which shifts from the primarily visual modality characteristic of 
our response to the exterior, to a multi-sensory response to the interior, 
involving hearing, touch, and smell, and leading to a general feeling for 
the immersive atmosphere created by the interaction of space, light, and 
surfaces, as we move through the building. 
Second, our aesthetic response to the museum’s architecture has distinct 
temporal phases, as we move from the exterior to the reception and other 
general use spaces and on to the galleries for art, ending in a literal or figurat-
ive looking back as we leave. This temporality means that our judgments of 
the exterior and interior are initially relatively distinct, as are our experi-
ences of the reception spaces vis a vis the art galleries. This explains why 
people can sometimes say things like: It’s exciting architecture [exterior and 
atrium], but not a very good museum [galleries]. Yet, if unity is an important 
aesthetic property, a serious critical judgment will finally have to take into 
consideration how all aspects of a building’s design come together.28 
The third peculiarity of our aesthetic judgment of architecture is that it 
is almost always aesthetically impure, especially with respect to function. 
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We seem to make tentative judgments about the appropriateness of form 
to functions all along the way, whether it is the appropriateness of an ex-
travagant exterior for identifying the building as an art museum or the 
appropriateness of a dramatically soaring atrium to heighten our expecta-
tions even as it serves the mundane functions of ticketing and orientation. 
But it is in the art galleries that our aesthetic experience of form mingles 
most completely with our perception of practical function, since we are 
more or less continuously aware of the interplay between the architecture 
and the art it contains. Of course, we may sometimes be so captivated by 
an artwork that we momentarily forget the architectural setting. Yet most 
of the time we will be aware of the architecture as a framework for the 
art, sometimes interacting supportively with it, as in the case of Moneo’s 
Moderna Museet, sometimes interacting intrusively, as in the case of 
Libeskind’s Denver Museum.
Obviously, a strict formalist could object to my description of these struc-
tural characteristics on the grounds that my informal phenomenology 
is biased in favor of the inclusion of function. It is just as reasonable to 
assume, the formalist might reply, that a critic primarily interested in 
architecture as a fine art would come to a museum with the intention of 
focusing purely on architectural form. This view is especially plausible 
given a particular philosophical tradition that understands the aesthetic 
experience of art as primarily a matter of responding to formal, sensuous, 
or expressive properties without regard to moral or practical purposes. 
Since my appeal to experience would obviously fail with such a critic, I 
must either try to find an argument that would make use of the separat-
ist’s focus on architectural form, or develop an alternative understanding 
of the nature of aesthetic judgment. I will take up each strategy in turn.
 One argument against the formalist approach is that, by ignoring the 
way an art museum’s architecture serves the art within, the formalist 
misses an essential aspect of the form of the building as a work of art. The 
reason is that the formalist fails to consider the way an architect’s artistic 
choices must take function into consideration in the process of design so 
that functional concerns become embodied in the very architectural forms 
on which formalists focus their attention. This is true even for those archi-
tects like Frank Gehry who are most eager to create architectural works 
of art “designed with a view to aesthetic appeal.” Consider Gehry’s justly 
celebrated Disney concert hall in Los Angeles, whose curving titanium 
exterior is similar to that of his Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. When he 
designed the interior of the Disney concert hall, Gehry did not just carve 
out a visually satisfying form, but hired acoustical engineers to guide him 
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in shaping it to provide the best possible sound environment.29 Similarly, 
at the Guggenheim Bilbao, Gehry designed more conventional looking 
galleries for modernist paintings, but restricted his most sculptural, curvi-
linear galleries for more recent installation and performance works. If 
one were to judge the Bilbao museum from a purely formal perspective, 
one might have to fault the traditional looking galleries as out of keeping 
with the rest of the museum, thereby blaming Gehry for failing to unify 
his design’s sculptural form rather than praising him for effectively com-
bining formal aims with a concern for functions. Thus, although practical 
functions may begin as external to a work, once an architect has taken 
them into account in designing a building, the architect’s choices with 
regard to function have become internal to the building as a work of art, 
analogous to the way the external subject matter of a representational 
painting becomes part of the internal content of the completed painting. 
Someone might object at this point that I am burdening our aesthetic 
response with the necessity of trying to find out the psychological inten-
tions of the architect. But artistic choices and intentions can be inferred 
from the properties of the work itself without the need for biographical 
knowledge. The knowledge of the building type and of the kind of art it 
is to contain is usually a sufficient basis for inference. Our aesthetic ap-
preciation of an art museum’s galleries, therefore, should not be directed 
only to the abstract formal properties that make them satisfying spaces 
in general, but, as Yuriko Saito puts it, at the way in which these same sen-
suous and design qualities converge to facilitate our encounter with the 
art they contain.30 Our appreciation of Moneo’s galleries in the Moderna 
Museet, for example, is based in part on the way in which he has artisti-
cally solved the problem of illumination; we appreciate his lanterns as 
simultaneously enhancing our viewing of the art and affording satisfying 
spatial experiences. And when we reflect on the museum as a whole we 
also note the way the lanterns contribute formal interest to the exterior.31 
But formalist critics could still make three objections to my argument 
from artistic choice. First, they could point out that many important art 
museums have been installed in former warehouses, factories, railway sta-
tions, and power plants, in which cases it would be absurd to claim we infer 
architectural choices from the way the galleries are designed. Second, 
whether gallery spaces are in an older building turned into a museum or in 
a newly designed building, the apparent fit between any given architectural 
space and the art it contains, may not be attributable to the architect, but to 
the museum’s curators who choose which art works to install in a given 
space, what color to paint the walls, where to focus artificial lighting, etc. In 
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reply to the first objection, I would point out that nearly all the warehouses, 
power plants, and other buildings adapted for use as art museums, have 
been significantly modified by architects commissioned precisely to make 
them suited to showing art. In fact, the case of adaptive reuse ac tually sup-
ports my point about inferred considerations of function, since most of the 
architects who are commissioned for this work are focusing primarily on 
making interior spaces that function effectively for showing art, rather than 
simply creating impressive architectural forms to be appreciated for their 
own sake. As for the second objection, concerning the important role of 
curators, it is certainly true that a curator may make poor use of an archi-
tectural space excellently designed for art, or may rescue a space poorly 
designed for art. In most cases, however, it is not difficult to sort out the 
architectural choices from the curatorial ones.32 One reviewer of Libes kind’s 
Denver addition, for example, entitled his review “It Works Despite 
Libeskind’s Best Efforts,” explaining that the curators had done a heroic job 
of making several of the galleries function well, despite Libeskind’s appar-
ent disregard of functional concerns in his design.33
But formalist critics would have a third, more principled objection to 
my account of the way functions are embodied in artistic forms, namely, 
that the noticing of an interaction of form and function in our architec-
tural experience is merely an empirical fact about some observers, not 
a necessary condition of aesthetic perception. Genuine aesthetic judg-
ments, they would say, simply are judgments about formal, sensory, and 
expressive properties, and the ability to make such judgments is precisely 
the ability to separate immediate responses to aesthetic properties from 
responses to artistic properties like choice and intention or to non-artistic 
properties like morality and function.
It would seem, therefore, that we must either re-define the nature of 
aesthetic experience and judgment or accept the traditional formalist 
under standing but make aesthetic experience only one part of a more 
general appreciation of architectural art. But the strategy of making aes-
thetic response only one part of a comprehensive artistic appreciation 
would still leave aesthetics and function judged separately before they 
were combined in an overall artistic judgment. What we really want to 
know is whether functional achievements or defects in a work of archi-
tectural art can enter into the process of aesthetic judging itself. For that 
we need a different concept of the aesthetic.
In looking for an alternative account of the aesthetic, we ought to avoid 
the arbitrariness of a merely stipulating definition by staying close to com-
mon usage and its roots in the long tradition stemming from Baumgarten, 
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Kant, and other eighteenth century thinkers. Of course, by now, many al-
ternatives to formalism are available that could make a place for function 
in aesthetic judgments. There are the various pragmatist and phenomeno-
logical approaches. There is Noel Carroll’s deflationary and disjunctive 
expansion of the idea of aesthetic experience that eliminates the for itself 
clause.34 Even more promising would seem to be Stephen Davies’ recently 
proposed “new model of aesthetic judgment” that he names “judgments of 
functional beauty.”35 Yet, instead of any of these, I will briefly draw upon 
some ideas from Kant himself – his controversial distinction between 
free and dependent beauty.36 There are many problems with it, beginning 
with the fact that Kant speaks of both judgments and objects as free or 
dependent. His examples of freely beautiful objects include flowers, ara-
besques, and absolute music whereas dependent beauties include repre-
sentational paintings, music set to words, and architecture. As for the two 
kinds of judgments, a judgment of free beauty is a spontaneous attending 
to the form of the object as it is entertained in a harmonious free play of 
the imagination and understanding. A judgment of dependent beauty, on 
the other hand, “presupposes […] the concept of the purpose that deter-
mines what the thing is to be.”37 One of Kant’s examples of a judgment of 
dependent beauty is our response to a church. “Much that could be liked 
directly in intuition could be added to a building,” says Kant, “if only the 
building were not to be a church.”38 When Kant concludes that such judg-
ments of dependent beauty are not pure aesthetic judgments, some phil-
osophers have asked how they could be aesthetic judgments at all, given 
the strictures he earlier placed on the role of concepts and purpose.39 But 
Kant seems in this passage to loosen his notion of subsumption under a 
concept, which is his criterion for a determinative judgment as opposed to 
an aesthetic one. He says that in a judgment of dependent beauty the con-
cept of a purpose does not determine, but merely constrains the freedom 
of the imagination.40 Thus, to use Kant’s example of a church, the purpose 
of a church as a place of Christian worship limits what architectural forms 
can please us aesthetically, but does not determine in advance any particu-
lar form that would satisfy or impede the needs of worship. 
Some scholars have interpreted Kant’s notion of constraint here as pri-
marily negative, that is, we first take note of an object’s purpose as an 
example of its kind and then we judge it formally as free beauty.41 Others 
have interpreted judgments of dependent beauty as an additive combina-
tion of a judgment based on intellectual pleasure in the satisfaction of 
purpose with a judgment based on a felt pleasure in form.42 On either 
of these accounts, knowing that a building is of a certain type leads us 
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to expect that it will minimally fulfill the functions of that type, and if it 
does so, we may go on to enjoy its formal features. But when a building 
serves its functions too poorly we may find our imagination impeded in 
its attempt to freely enjoy the building’s forms.43 Both the constraint and 
the combination approaches to judgments of dependent beauty do make 
function relevant to aesthetic judgment, but, by suggesting a two stage 
approach to aesthetic judgment, both remain relatively close to the sepa-
ratist position we are trying to overcome. 
 What we need is an account of judgments of dependent beauty that 
can show how function can be a more integral part of the process of aes-
thetic judging. Of the several reconstruction’s of Kant’s idea of dependent 
beauty that argue for a more intimate involvement, I find most convinc-
ing that of Rachel Zuckert in Kant on Beauty and Biology.44 For Zuckert, 
aesthetic judgment in general “comprises attention to all the empirical, 
sensibly apprehended properties of an object” as these are “reciprocally, 
internally unified” in the play of imagination and understanding.45 In a 
judgment of free beauty this unification of our experience is based on the 
object’s form, but in a judgment of dependent beauty, concepts such as 
those of aesthetic ideas or of the object’s purpose are, as Zuckert puts it, 
“‘incorporated’ into an (overarching) representation […] of the object’s 
purposive form.”46 Thus, on Zuckert’s interpretation, “when we appreciate 
an object as a church, the properties that make it a member of its kind are 
taken to be aesthetically relevant […] within aesthetic judging.”47 In Zuckert’s 
account of dependent beauty, then, an object’s conceptual contents or its 
practical purposes do not merely constrain free judgment from the outside, 
or get combined with free judgments in an additive way, but are fully inte-
grated into a distinctive process of aesthetic judging. 
Of course, by incorporating ideas of content or purpose into the play 
of imagination and understanding, such judgments are rendered impure, 
as compared to a play of the imagination based only upon formal proper-
ties. Moreover, unlike judgments of free beauty judgments of dependent 
beauty can lay no claim to universality.48 But the point of having a concept 
such as dependent beauty is precisely to make room for a distinctive kind 
of aesthetic judgment that permits the inclusion of features like artistic 
intention or practical function. Such judgments are still genuinely aes-
thetic since they are neither judgments of mere agreeableness nor are 
they determinative judgments that subsume instances under a concept. 
Functionality, therefore, can be incorporated into a genuine aesthetic 
judgment of architecture, so long as function is experienced “as itself to 
be in play with the object’s [many] other sensible properties.”49 
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Whether or not Zuckert’s particular reconstruction of the concept of 
dependent beauty is accepted as the most convincing interpretation of 
Kant, it offers us a useful way of philosophically articulating our ordinary 
intuition that form and function should be united in architecture. Paul 
Guyer has persuasively argued that all three of the major interpretations 
of dependent beauty – the constraint view, the combination view, and the 
internal view – can find some textual support in Kant and that, moreover, 
all three reflect various ways form and function are actually related in our 
ordinary experience.50 In the case of architecture, however, the advantage 
of the internal view of dependent beauty judgments over the other two is 
that it shows how function can enter most intimately into the process of 
aesthetic judging itself. 
Nick Zangwill, another philosopher interested in reformulating Kant’s 
idea of dependent beauty, has also applied it to the problem of function in 
architecture, but he has raised the worry that attempts to incorporate the 
specific functions of a building type into aesthetic judgments may find no 
logical stopping point.51 How, he asks, do we determine which functions are 
relevant in each case without getting into an endless process of ever nar-
rower specification, for example, from judging a building as a church, to 
judging it as a catholic or protestant church, to judging it as a certain type 
of protestant church, and so on? One possible solution Zangwill suggests 
is that we avoid ascribing beauty or aesthetic excellence to a building as a 
specific type, but “only see it as having the broad function of being some 
building or other.”52 But that solution would land us back with Scruton and 
Winter in the denial that the specific functions of a building matter to our 
aesthetic judgments. 
I believe Zangwill’s worry is excessive. The danger of an infinite regress 
is perhaps a problem for some versions of the constraint and combination 
approaches to dependent beauty in which the judgment that an object is 
an adequate exemplar of its type remains relatively external to the process 
of imaginative free play. The advantage of a more integrative account of 
dependent beauty judgments like Zuckert’s is that “we take many more 
properties into account” than those that render an object simply “a good 
member of its kind.”53 In our case of the art museum as a building type, for 
example, we certainly have to move to the appropriate level of specificity 
since the kind of architectural forms that would satisfy the function of a 
great historical museum like the Prado in Madrid would obviously be dif-
ferent from the forms appropriate to a museum like the Kiasma Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Helsinki.54 In actual aesthetic judging, relevance fi-
nally has to be decided at the level of the individual building and the critic 
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must adjudicate an exceedingly complex interaction of numerous factors. 
On the understanding of aesthetic judgment I am recommending, 
therefore, the unity that we seek in aesthetic judging is not restricted to 
purely formal properties as it would be in a judgment of free beauty, but 
includes attention to the ease with which form can be integrated with 
practical function and other features in the play of imagination. Within 
this kind of dependent beauty framework, of course, critical judgments 
would have to be qualified by the principle: when all relevant aspects are 
given due weight. Given the multiple functions of many of today’s art 
museums, enabling the thoughtful display of art works is only one of 
several practical and other functions architects and critics must address. 
Yet, if we are to call something an art museum, surely whatever propor-
tion of a museum building is given over to the display of art, that part 
should be designed in a way that supports viewers’ attention to the kinds 
of works the museum contains. Thus, even though there may be blame-
less differences in the way people weigh relevant aspects in the process 
of aesthetic judgment, one thing they cannot justifiably do: they cannot 
give the practical functions of a building type zero weight in an overall 
aesthetic judgment. 
Unfortunately, Kant himself, at the very end of his discussion of de-
pendent beauty seems to pull the rug out from under not only such an 
internal view of the effect of practical function on aesthetic judgment, but 
even from under the constraint and combination views. Kant says that a 
person may, either through ignorance of an object’s purpose or, by delib-
erately abstracting from purpose, judge such a work of dependent beauty 
as if it were a free beauty.55 Certainly, Kant is right to point out that when 
we are ignorant of a building’s purpose – as we often are when we visit a 
strange city – we are likely to respond to a striking work of architecture 
purely as form. But Kant’s other claim, that even when we know what the 
function is, we may deliberately abstract from it, while also empirically 
true, has disturbing implications. Kant’s claim could be seen as endorsing 
the extreme formalist separation of form and function, allowing a critic 
to totally disregard the function of a work of architecture without blame, 
whereas I have argued that the idea of dependent beauty implies, at the 
least, that a critic cannot blamelessly exclude function altogether. 
Although there are ways to construe Kant’s statement as not under-
mining the idea of dependent beauty, his statement does articulate the 
other ordinary intuition we have about works of architecture that I men-
tioned at the beginning of my paper. 56 I said there that alongside our 
intuition that aesthetics and function should be united in architecture, we 
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seem to have an equally natural intuition that some buildings are so beau-
tiful we may enjoy their appearance without regard to their functions. 
 For the philosophy of architecture, I can think of no more interesting 
witness to this kind of intuition than Ludwig Wittgenstein. In Vienna in 
1926, Wittgenstein designed a fine house in the modern style for his sister 
but was disappointed with it because he felt it lacked what he called “pri-
mordial life, wild life.”57 For just as “every purposive movement of the hu-
man body” is not “a gesture,” so “every functional building” is not “architec-
ture.”58 Here, Wittgenstein seems to raise the architecture vs. building topos 
to a far higher level than Pevsner’s “aesthetic appeal,” suggesting that true 
works of architecture may evoke an almost ecstatic response.59 Similarly, 
the critic, Andrew Ballantyne, has translated the building vs. architecture 
continuum into one between ordinary and visionary architecture, for which 
he uses the metaphors of the “nest” and the “pillar of fire.” “At one end of the 
scale we have the nest, a modest and comforting place to […] feel at home; 
at the other we have the extravagant pyre which consumes vast resources, 
and fills us with awe.”60 Ordinary buildings – nests of all kinds, including 
most art museums – are designed, Ballantyne suggests, by architects who 
see themselves as problem solving professionals working with their clients 
to achieve a common goal of integrating functional and aesthetic values. 
Visionary buildings, on the other hand, are designed by architects who see 
themselves primarily as free artists and who today are giving us the most 
spectacular displays of “avant-garde extravagance” in architecture.61
How do Wittgenstein’s and Ballantyne’s ideas apply to architectural 
spectacles such as the Guggenheim Bilbao or the new wing of the Denver 
Museum? Would it not seem petty to allow such mundane matters as 
utility spoil excitement at wild architectural form? Would critics not be 
justified in setting aside questions of purpose in the case of such visionary 
buildings and treat them as free beauty?62 Can such a perspective possibly 
be reconciled with the dependent beauty argument that function has a 
necessary role to play in aesthetic response? 
Despite all the talk of wild, primordial, visionary, or extravagant archi-
tecture, I would argue that with few exceptions even the most spectacular 
works of contemporary architectural art are still buildings that have pur-
poses. Of course, certain historical works, like the Pantheon in Rome or 
some Gothic Cathedrals, form a special case; we treat them as monuments 
of architectural art that can justifiably be enjoyed as objects of free beauty, 
although they may still be used for some purpose. And even in the case of 
contemporary buildings like the Guggenheim Bilbao or the Denver Mu-
seum of Art, we may be so overwhelmed by the buildings’ formal, sensory, 
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and expressive properties, that when all things are given due weight, we 
will be prepared to forgive their functional faults. But that is very differ-
ent from declaring function to be irrelevant.63 
In the case of the Guggenheim Bilbao, for example, its wonderfully 
sculptural exterior and the soaring curves of its atrium not only serve the 
symbolic function of proclaiming Bilbao’s resurgence and the practical 
function of drawing thousands of tourists, but most of its galleries are 
appropriate to the differing kinds of art each is meant to contain.64 In 
short, the Bilbao museum’s aesthetic power could be seen as more than 
compensating for its relatively few practical shortcomings. 
In the case of Libeskind’s Denver addition, on the other hand, despite 
a wonderfully wild exterior, whose iconic presence is also both symboli-
cally and practically good for its city, many critics have found the lack 
of integration of form and function on the interior to negatively affect 
their overall aesthetic judgment. Unlike Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in 
Berlin, which has many formal similarities to his Denver addition and has 
also created problems for its curators, the Denver design’s functional fail-
ures are such that its symbolic and spiritual expressiveness is not strong 
enough to compensate for them.65
But what about museums like the Moderna Museet, that fall some-
where between the visionary and the ordinary? Those who go to art mu-
seums primarily to encounter art are likely to prefer museums that are 
conducive to reflection rather that spectacle and astonishment and they 
may find museums like the Moderna excellent examples of the successful 
integration of form and function. 
As these cases show, although aesthetic judgments of the dependent 
beauty type must incorporate function along with form (and other fac-
tors) into the process of aesthetic judging, there is enormous variability 
in the relative weight that may be appropriately given each factor. In this 
way, I believe, we can philosophically reconcile both our intuition of a 
desirable concord between form and function in architecture, and our 
corresponding intuition that some works are aesthetically so exceptional 
that we may forgive their function faults.66 
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Friedman’s less charitable comment on the way Gehry’s architecture expresses the 
violent process of Bilbao’s transformation from a working industrial city into a 
tourist destination. Cited in Mimi Zeiger, New Museums: Contemporary Museum 
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Architecture Around the World (New York: Rizzoli International, 2005), 9. The many 
ramifications of Krens’s franchising program for the Guggenheim as it has played 
out in Bilbao are traced in several of the essays in Learning from the Guggenheim 
Bilbao, ed. Anna Maria Guasch and Josebe Zulaika (Reno, NV: University of Reno, 
2005) and in Joseba Zulaika’s earlier study Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa: Museums, 
Architecture, and City Renewal (Reno, NV: University of Nevada at Reno, 2003).
65. If we look at the critical and public response to the Jewish Museum, where 
the jagged plan and angled windows are expressive of relationships and ideas con-
nected to the Holocaust, the difficulties curators have had in installing exhibitions 
have not led to an overall negative reaction. In Berlin, Libeskind had a set of pro-
found historical and spiritual concerns to embody and his Jewish Museum may 
be the very kind of thing Wittgenstein had in mind in speaking of architecture as 
“primordial life, wild life.”
66. Obviously, not only does a great deal more need to be said about the relation 
of practical function to aesthetic judgment, but also about its connection to other 
facets of architecture that I have not been able to consider: the relation of build-
ings to their sites, their environmental and social impact, matters of structure 
and comfort, the way buildings embody meanings. Even more closely intertwined 
with the problem of aesthetics and function, although also related to all the just 
mentioned issues, is the question of architecture and morality that Paden has so 
insightfully discussed in relation to Wittgenstein. Buildings play such an import-
ant role in our everyday lives – physically, socially, aesthetically, and spiritually 
– that an architect’s concern with functions often goes far beyond narrow utility 
to involve a profound responsibility to those who live, work, and play in their 
buildings and to the community at large that has to look on them. Moreover, the 
approach to the problem of aesthetics and morality that I find most congenial is 
Noel Carroll’s moderate moralism which parallels the position I have taken on the 
incorporation of function into aesthetic judgments of architecture. From Carroll’s 
moderate moralism perspective a moral defect can sometimes be an aesthetic 
defect and a moral virtue can sometimes be an aesthetic virtue, but moral defects 
and virtues must be weighed against many other properties, including formal 
ones. See his “Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent Directions of Re-
search,” Ethics 110, 2 (January 2000): 350–387.
